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Abstract 
This article examines the issue of peace and restraint within ongoing conflicts. While the vast 
majority of the literature on civil wars in Africa concentrates on drivers of conflict and instances of 
violence, there are zones of peace where locally peace processes have developed despite conflicts 
around them. These spaces have been neglected in both the academic literature and the major 
datasets on conflict and war, which mostly focuses on the belligerent, or sometimes the victims. The 
literature that does exist is concentrated in Latin America (especially Colombia) rather than Africa. 
This paper records six different episodes in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone and seeks to understand 
the reasons why these spaces were able to maintain some level of peace. The paper discusses the 
practicalities of exercising peace on the ground and the implications for subsequent peacebuilding, 
along with drawing conclusions about differences in the nature of warfare regionally. 
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Introduction 
Research on conflict resolution has mainly focused on war prevention or post-conflict reconciliation. 
Nevertheless, there has been an increase in literature on so-called ‘zones of peace’: territories in 
which communities aim to reduce the negative impact of armed conflict through non-violent 
means.1 However, this logic of non-violence during conflict is scarcely covered in the African 
academic literature, and yet across two very different conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, we 
can observe the same phenomenon of localised grassroots peace initiatives and activities during 
conflict. Local communities are not passive within wars and make choices between violence and 
peace depending on their own perceptions of risks and returns. However, contemporary datasets 
document significant instances of violence against civilians (the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in Sierra Leone documents more than 40,000) but none document instances of peace. Our 
knowledge on how civilians manage to contain violence or contribute to non-violence in conflict-
affected environments is very limited. A literature on civilian-led peace movements and community 
self-protection does exist showing civilians promoting norms of peace, nonviolence and ‘cultures of 
peace’. 2 African scholarship on communal violence has emphasised the role of civilian agency in 
perpetrating violence, and the role of leadership in violence and violence prevention, but this 
literature does not show how leadership prevents or stops violence. 3 At the same time, evidence 
from Nigeria also implies that the incorporation of these ‘middle range’ actors could be instrumental 
in facilitating peacebuilding.4 
Hancock and Mitchell define zones of peace as being a social sanctuary which is viewed either as a 
geographical or social space where individuals are protected against personal violability based on 
agreed rules of public order.5  A zone of peace also offers flexibility that allows local communities to 
ensure that armed actors abide by certain rules to limit the costs of armed conflict through reducing 
violence. Communities within these zones engage in civil resistance to armed actors by applying 
unarmed power and non-violent methods including strikes, boycotts and demonstrations, or just 
non-compliance.6 This article takes six examples where local agreements have resulted in localised 
peace across Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire and then examines how far they conform to the logic of 
zones of peace literature. 
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature on peacebuilding in general, and 
peace zones specifically. Firstly, it is also important to note that despite the proximity and similarity 
between the various West African wars, there has not been much comparative work between 
                                                          
1 Hancock, L. & Mitchell, C. (eds), Zones of Peace, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2007; Mitchell, C and Hancock, L Local 
Peacebuilding and National Peace: Interaction Between Grassroots and Elite Processes, New York, Continuum. 2012. 
2García Durán, M.  Movimiento por la Paz en Colombia 1978-2003, Bogota: CINEP. (2006) ; Kaplan, O. ‘Nudging Armed 
Groups: How Civilians Transmit Norms of Protection’, Stability, 2.2 (2013) 1-8; Annette Idler, María Belén Garrido & Cécile 
Mouly (2015) Peace Territories In Colombia: Comparing Civil Resistance In Two War-Torn Communities, Journal of 
Peacebuilding & Development, 10:3, 1-15; Garcia, E. 1997, ‘Filipino Zones of Peace’ in Peace Review 9: 2: 221–224; Arviola, 
Jr, S. 2008, ‘Community-Based Peace Building Program: The Case of Bual Zone of Peace, Philippines’ in Asia-Pacific Social 
Science Review 8: 2: 51–59. 
3  Krause, J. ‘Non-violence and civilian agency in communal war: Evidence from Jos, Nigeria’, African Affairs, 116(463), 
(2017) 261-283. 
4 Krause, ‘Non-violence and civilian agency’ 
5 Hancock and Mitchell, Zones of peace 
6 Idler et al, ‘Peace territories in Colombia’ 
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them7. The causes of the war for both Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire have been very much debated, 
and there is a large volume of evidence on the wars8. Despite this, the only comparative article is 
Chauveau and Richards focussing on agrarian change, showing how violence offers scope for 
adjustment to pressure when other means fail9. Their comparison contrasts different trajectories of 
agrarian social change, making the point that Côte d’Ivoire was a conflict to uphold a lineage-based 
social order, while this was the opposite for Sierra Leone. 
Secondly, the literature on zones of peace is primarily concerned with Latin America, particularly 
Colombia, with other examples drawn from the Philippines. Whilst there is some short discussion on 
examples as wide ranging as Northern Ireland, South Africa and the Caucasus, the literature in these 
areas is sparse. For Africa, a continent blighted by conflict, there is surprisingly little literature on 
zones of peace and almost none on the Mano River Region. This article therefore makes an 
important contribution to the overall literature by adding new examples in an under-researched 
field and in a new geographical area not currently addressed by the literature. 
This paper uses an inductive approach to draw out lessons that can be used to explain localised 
peace processes, or ‘zones of peace’. It takes a retrospective view of two conflicts known to the 
authors and documents six specific cases of localised peace processes within conflicts. The primary 
data for our analysis is based on interviews for both of our case studies, most notably with former 
combatants, Young Patriots members, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Community Defence 
Forces (CDF), civil servants and local government officials, traditional leaders and representatives of 
the religious community, and citizens. The authors have long histories of working in these countries, 
including fieldwork in Sierra Leone between 2002-5 on decentralisation and Chiefdom systems, 
2007, 2009 and 2013 on security sector reforms, and in Côte d’Ivoire between 2011-13 on the civil 
war and 2014-17 on large-scale investments and peacebuilding.  
This article starts by examining the current literature on this subject and focuses and develop this 
idea of zones of peace. It will analyse three examples in both Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, defining 
these communities and their relationship with armed groups, and understanding the extent to which 
this peace process is externally influenced or internally driven. It will particularly focus on the 
creation of these peace zones, rather than the implementation of peace. Through these micro-case 
studies, the authors will question the current literature emphasis on peace and armed forces and 
the particularity of the West African setting in terms of leadership and agency.  
                                                          
7 Hoffman, D. The War Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 2011); Allouche, J., Benson M. and M’Cormack, F. ‘The End of the Mano River War(s)’, IDS Evidence 
Report. 188 (2016) 
8 Banegas, R. ‘Briefing: Post-Election Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire: The Gbonhi War’, African Affairs 110.440 (2011)   457–68; 
McGovern, M. Making War in Côte d'Ivoire.( London: C. Hurst Publishers, 2011); Richards, P. Fighting for the Rain Forest: 
War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, (Oxford: James Currey, 1996); Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P. Security 
Transformation in Sierra Leone 1997-2007, GFN-SSR and DFID  (2009); Jackson, P. and Albrecht, P. Reconstruction Security 
After Conflict. Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone, London: Palgrave-Macmillan. (2011) 
9 Chauveau, J.P. and Richards, P. ‘West African Insurgencies in Agrarian Perspective: Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone 
Compared’. Journal of Agrarian Change, 8.4 (2008) 515-552. 
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What governs zones of peace? 
In seeking to understand the logic of violence, Kalyvas uses the example of two very similar and 
contiguous Greek villages in the peninsula of the Peloponnese that faced two different trajectories: 
one resulted in a general massacre while the other prevented this type of violence10. He concludes 
that territorial contestation is a key variable to explain both the prevalence of violence and its 
absence, but importantly also concludes that the outcomes are linked to different alliances within 
networks that link the local and national. This opens up the potential of analysing the dynamics that 
lead to peace rather than conflict and what Strauss calls the dynamics of restraint. Strauss defines 
factors of restraint as ideas, interactions and institutions that provide incentives for leaders and/or 
citizens to abstain from, or moderate, extensive violence in the way that, for example, Williams 
documents in India11. Williams’ emphasis on ‘understanding the persistence of everyday harmony’ 
shifts the emphasis from understanding the dynamics of conflict to understanding and researching 
the dynamics of peace12. 
Hancock and Mitchell draw on empirical evidence primarily from Colombia, but also from the 
Philippines, in establishing eight factors for successful peace zones and make it more likely that a 
community will convince armed actors to comply with rules that allow a reduction of violence13: (i) 
strong internal cohesion and leadership and efforts to expand the functions of the sanctuary beyond 
protection; (ii) declared neutrality and impartial behaviour of the people residing in the territory; (iii) 
presence of credible sanctions for violation; (iv) absence of perceivable threats to outside interests; 
(v) a framework of accepted rules and norms regarding rights and obligations of both the community 
and external actors; (vi) limited incentives for community members and armed actors to violate this 
framework; (vii) strong patron interest in the preservation of sanctuary and leverage on potential 
violators; and (viii) clear markers on the territorial boundaries of the zone. Idler et al further simplify 
these eight factors in to three groups ‘for the purpose of analytical clarity’ and it is these three 
groups that we will use to frame our analysis14: the characteristics of the civil resistance movement 
in the peace territory, (i); the relationship of the community with armed actors, (ii) to (vi); and the 
role of external actors, (vii) to (viii). 
The characteristics of the civil resistance movement 
Kaplan identifies social cohesion as a critical element of civil society movements that seek to engage 
with armed actors.15 Social cohesion allows institutional solutions to avoid participation in conflict, 
manage internal community order to limit the ability of armed groups to infiltrate local communities 
and also to demand accountability from those groups. This is similar to Varshney and Krause’s 
analysis of ethnic conflict in India and Nigeria respectively further that takes social cohesion and 
                                                          
10 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence 
11Williams, P. ‘Hindu-Muslim brotherhood: exploring the dynamics of communal relations in Varanasi, North India’, Journal 
of South Asian Development, 2.2 (2007) 153-176; Straus, S. ‘Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the 
Dynamics of Restraint’, Perspectives on Politics 10 (2012) 343–62: 344 
12 Williams, ‘Hindu-Muslim’ : 154 
13 Hancock and Mitchell, Zones of Peace 
14 Idler et al, ‘Peace territories in Colombia’, p.2 
15 Kaplan, O., ‘‘Protecting Civilians in Civil War: The Institution of the ATCC in Colombia’ in Journal of Peace Research 50: 
3: 351–367, 2013 
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civilians as key agents within these networks, again emphasising processes over variables16. 
Widespread participation of community members in local peacebuilding activities helps to enforce 
and encourage social cohesion, but also the resulting collective action serves to enhance domestic 
protection within that community and strengthen the hand of any community negotiating with an 
armed actor.17 The literature further develops this by stressing the importance of collective 
leadership, specifically leadership that does not rely on one individual, but where the entire 
community participates, or at least supports the initiative.18 
In Africa, the idea of including different actors is very much present in peacebuilding debates but has 
been associated with the inclusion of civil society voices into the political settlement19.  Several 
studies show the strong correlation between civil society participation and sustained peace and, 
whilst democracy has been seen as the main expression of inclusion, this ignores local social and 
political dynamics and the actual construction of legitimacy at the local level20. In addition, the 
incorporation of civilian agency is a critical aspect of this, particularly as supporters or as opposition 
to violent groups. In Sierra Leone, for example, local populations established kamajor militias as CDF 
to fight the RUF, drawing from a variety of local institutions including secret societies, hunter militias 
and village groups. In Côte d’Ivoire, local militias were also created to fight against mostly Liberian 
mercenaries that were causing instability in the Western region following the armed conflict in 2002.  
The local community is therefore, in many ways an extremely pluralistic one with multiple groups 
that has been difficult to form in to a coherent voice. Research on West Africa in particular, though 
not exclusively, emphasises the role of dense networks of institutions at the local level that provide 
the sinews of socio-political networks21. These networks comprise a multitude of overlapping 
institutions, both formal and informal, seen and unseen, underpinned by what James Scott refers to 
as ‘infrapolitics’22. 
This is further complicated by the issue of collective leadership in a context where leadership has 
been dominated by the idea of what Utas calls ‘Bigmanity’.23 Bigmanity exists within frameworks of 
warfare in parts of Africa that exhibit some of the key characteristics of Duffield’s networked warfare 
whereby wars do not follow the traditional state-based patterns of warfare, but multiple actors each 
                                                          
16 Varshney, A. Civic life and ethnic conflict: Hindus and Muslims in India, (New Haven: Yale University Press. 2002); Krause, 
‘Non-Violence and Civilian Agency’ 
17 Arjona, A. 2014, ‘Civilian Resistance to Rebel Governance’, HiCN Working Paper 170, Households in Conflict Network, 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, 2014; Kaplan, ‘Protecting Civilians’ 
18 See Hancock and Mitchell, Zones of Peace (p.212) for a detailed discussion on this. 
19 Tadros, M and J. Allouche ‘Political settlements as a violent process: deconstructing the relationship between political 
settlements and intrinsic, instrumental and resultant forms of violence’, Conflict, Security and Development, 17 (3) (2017) 
187-204. 
20 John, A. W. S., and Kew, D. ‘Civil society and peace negotiations: Confronting exclusion’, International Negotiation, 13(1), 
(2008) 11-36; Nilsson, D. ‘Anchoring the peace: Civil society actors in peace accords and durable peace’. International 
Interactions, 38(2), (2012) 243-266. 
21 Fanthorpe, R ‘Neither Citizen not Subject? “Lumpen” agency and the legacy of native administration in Sierra Leone’, 
African Affairs, 100(2001) 363-86; Ferme, M. The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone, 
(University of California Press, 2001); Moran Ethnography of Political Violence  
22 These are sometimes referred to as ‘hidden’ politics, although this is something of a misnomer since they are not hidden 
to local people. See Scott,  J (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, New Haven, Yale University 
Press 
23 Utas, M African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big men and networks, (London, Zed Books 2012) 
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pursuing different aims24. Critically, wartime networks in West Africa consisted of a multitude of 
actors incorporating politicians, military, financial, trading, international, smugglers, international 
NGOs, religious leaders, warlords and local leaders like chiefs. Each of these networks also exist at 
different levels of society from the international to the village. This conceptualisation of conflict 
undermines traditional ways of looking at conflict as defined by clear categories including religion or 
ethnicity, but more particularly there are very few clear boundaries between groups, whether 
peaceful or not. However, it does allow for the positive use of Bigmanity to change the shape of 
social networks for peace as well as conflict if the incentives are right. 
The community and armed actors 
The second major group is the relationship of the community with the armed actors. Certainly in 
long-established movements like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), it is very likely 
that there will be very close relationships between the armed groups and the community and, as 
Idler et al identify, several communities have friends and relatives as part of armed groups. These 
armed groups are therefore both a threat and also embedded within local communities. Whilst it 
may be the case that this could make it easier to negotiate with armed groups, it does not seem to 
be clear cut within the literature. Links may act as conduits through which negotiation may happen, 
but that does not mean that peace zones are necessarily the clear outcome of those negotiations, 
suggesting that the linkages between communities and armed groups are more complex than first 
conceptualised, particularly in terms of defining boundaries. 
This may lead to trust difficulties. Negotiation requires direct and trusted channels based on 
relationships, which may exist between family, and are common in other conflicts, but trust can be 
extremely sensitive to context. Without interpersonal trust within the community, for example, 
direct negotiating channels and relationships between groups can be exploited for personal gain, 
sometimes against other members of the community, or used as a form of power, particularly when 
access to information is exploited by gatekeepers.25 Mistrust within the local community attacks the 
very core of a peace zone, which relies on cohesion to act collectively against the violent actor, and 
community members may begin to follow guerrilla set rules rather than community ones. In 
Colombia, Idler et al found that as long as everyone follows the rules, the guerrillas respect the 
community.26 This may be significantly complicated by the presence of multiple violent groups, 
however, each of which may or may not have their own rules. As Hancock and Mitchell point out, 
one of the most difficult environments for peace zones is where the control of a previous actor is 
disrupted by a rival attempting to take control of a territory.  
A critical element of the overall relationship, however, is the role of incentives to maintain or 
undermine the peace itself. As Hancock and Mitchell identify there has to be limited incentives to 
violate the framework and this can be extremely difficult to establish. This speaks directly to the 
underlying causes of conflict itself and the aims of the different actors within peace processes. What 
motivates each party and what was the origin of the conflict in the first place are usually influential 
in the nature of the resulting peace. What much of the literature around zones of peace tends to 
                                                          
24 Duffield, M Global Governance and the New Wars: The merging of development and security, (London, Zed Books, 2001); 
Duffield, M ‘War as a network enterprise: the new security terrain and its implications’, Journal for Cultural Research, 6 
(2002) 153-65 
25 Kaplan, ‘Protecting Civilians’ also points out that information can be distorted in some of these relationships. 
26 Idler et al, ‘Peace Territories’ 
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emphasise is the positive peace: zones are about bottom-up, community based and negotiated 
peace, whereas the underlying causes of the conflict may lead to different outcomes based on those 
underlying drivers. This may, of course, lead to positive peace outcomes of democratic and 
community based peace as an expression of the importance of voice, or it could lead to what 
effectively amounts to short term business transactions if economics is the underlying driver. 
The role of external actors 
There are also tensions between local communities and external actors. Certainly, there are 
significant external actors involved in most conflict areas, particularly NGOs. Much of the scholarship 
on zones of peace so far has examined grassroots initiatives that were partly established and driven 
by communities but with significant external support. For example, Idler et al discuss the role of 
REDEPAZ in Colombia as an external actor that advised local leaders to establish a peace zone as part 
of a bigger ‘One Hundred Municipalities of Peace in Colombia’ project.27 At the same time, much of 
the literature on zones of peace is concerned with how to establish them and what is required for 
one to work, and contains several discussions of the role of NGOs in supporting the deliberate 
establishment of zones of peace.28  
In general the literature on the role of external actors tends to mirror broader literature on the 
tensions between bottom-up and top-down approaches to activity.29 External support mechanisms 
for expertise, finance, legal and strategic support can be extremely welcome for community 
organisations, along with links beyond the community to other likeminded communities.30 However, 
such initiatives may also crowd out, rather than support local activities and there is a fine line 
between providing support and imposing an externally driven agenda. Whilst Hancock and Mitchell 
identify strong patron support within a clear territorial zone as critical elements of a successful zones 
of peace, this may also have its costs in the form of genuine bottom-up approaches when that 
patron, for example a NGO, has its own strong agenda. 
Cote d’Ivoire 
It is important to understand the history and the nature of violence in Côte d’Ivoire to better 
understand how these communities in zones of peace look like.  The civil war started on 19 
September 2002. The government of Laurent Gbagbo, in power since 2000, was threatened by a 
rebellion in the north and the west and the country became divided into three areas. A reconciliation 
process under international auspices was started in 2003 and a government of national unity was 
formed in 2005. Elections were finally organised in November 2010. The disputed result led into a 
full-scale military conflict between forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo and supporters of the 
internationally recognised president-elect Alassane Ouattara. In terms of violence intensity, the 
situation was critical in 2002 and in 2011. In-between, it was very much a no peace, no war situation. 
One could distinguish two main forms of violence, an urban one that mostly involved militias and a 
                                                          
27 Idler et al, ‘Peace Territories’ 
28 See Hancock & Mitchell (eds), Zones of Peace, and Mitchell and Hancock, Local Peacebuilding for good examples of this, 
particularly the chapter by Warfield and Jennings in Local Peacebuilding. The literature tends to be dominated by people 
who have been active in this area, and so there is a practicality about their approaches.  
29 Mitchell and Hancock, Local Peacebuilding, even ends with a call for complementarity. 
30 Gray, V., ‘Nonviolence and Sustainable Resource Use with External Support: A Survival Strategy in Rural 
Colombia’ in Latin American Perspectives39: 1: 43–114, 2012 
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rural one (‘sons of soil’), which occurred in the western part of the country. The distinction between 
urban and rural forms of violence is important as rural violence was continuous and mostly between 
civilians while urban violence was more linked to key political events (especially in 2002 and 2011).  
We will show various type of local peacebuilding initiatives in the most violent zones in Cote d’Ivoire, 
which is the western region along the Liberian border. They were 5 pro-government militias in the 
region:  the Alliance Patriotique Wê (AP- Wê), the Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest (FLGO), the 
Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l’Ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire (MILOCI), the Union des 
Patriotes pour la Résistance du Grand Ouest (UPRGO), and the Liberian-backed LIMA forces. In terms 
of anti-government forces, the initial three militias, Mouvement Patriotique pour la Côte d’Ivoire 
(MPCI), Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice 
et la Paix (MJP) merged into one force in February 2003, called Forces Nouvelles (FN). The Dozos, a 
traditional hunter’s society, were also a key ally to the FN. 
These zones of peace consist of different types of communities.  Let us first focus on rural 
communities. It is important to understand that the land issue became politicised before the war 
started. Confronted with unemployment in Abidjan and other major cities, the youth returned to the 
west to discover that their families’ land had been leased or sold, creating many tensions between 
the autochthones and the migrants. The temptation by this group to regain control of what they saw 
as their land created many conflicts with the migrants (see Allouche & Zadi, 2013).  
Some rural communities realised the potential of land-related violence as soon as the war started in 
2002 and putting in place clear and consensual mechanisms for the usage of land. This was the case 
of the village of Yacoli Dabouo, a large village of 7,000 inhabitants located in the department of 
Soubré. A village council, representing the different communities, was put in place, to sensitise 
about the illegal nature of selling land.  All the land-to-land management and tenure transactions 
were administered and recorded by the management committee, and then sent to the sub-prefect 
office for registration. This means that any point of discords happening after these transactions can 
be arbitrated by the sub-prefect office in a more transparent and neutral way.  
The village went even further as the problem was not just about land tenure but also youth 
employment. Since their elders had sold land to incomers, the village council negotiated an 
agreement with the incomers whereby one-third of the land was given back to the youth. All the 
parties, whether the youth or the incomers, benefited from the NGO OUYINE (which was created by 
Zadi Kessy Marcel, the current president of the Economic and Social Council in Côte d’Ivoire, who 
was originally from this village), which distributed hevea plans to everybody and a new rubber 
treatment factory was installed by Zadi Kessy Marcel, to thank the community for the agreement 
(Zadi & Sohou, forthcoming) As a result, since 2010, there has been no reported incident in this 
community, whether between the youth groups of the different ethnic communities or when the 
armed forces of Ouatarra were marching down towards Abidjan.  
Other rural communities were more reactive. Forms of violence occurred but quick resolution 
mechanisms were put into place to facilitate the return of expelled communities. This is what 
happened in Guidoubaï. In December 2002, many land labourers, who had migrated to the area for 
decades, were expelled.   A meeting was organised in February 2003 with all the traditional chiefs 
and representatives of the various ethnic groups at Guidoubaï. The sacrifice killing of a beef was an 
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important symbolic moment in containing the tensions as this sacrifice was sending an important 
message in the Wè culture and traditions. Following the meeting, many of the Baoulé that had run 
away came back to their plantations.31 The situation remained stable even during the 2011 crisis. 
Like in Yacoli Dabouo, the resolution was made possible through the contribution and leadership of 
an influential man who was coming from this village.  
Another similar initiative was organised by Yahi Octave through his NGO, Nouvelle Famille, in the 
villages of Sokoura and camps in Japon and other villages located in the protected forest of 
Gouindebe Zagné. 32 to facilitate repatriation. In the village of Sokoura (in the protected forest of Sio, 
next to Bedi Gouazon), the security was ensured by local ‘rebels’ and the overall security depended 
on the gendarmes of Man (controlled by rebels at that time) rather than those of Guiglo even 
though it was under Guiglo’s jurisdiction. The chief of the Burkinabe community in Guiglo, Ki 
Jacques, helped to organise the visit in 2009. Celebrations including the killing of a beef was 
organised to receive Yahi Octave with his delegations. In this village, it was the opposite, it was the 
autochthones which had been expulsed in 2003. These various local peacebuilding rural initiatives 
around Guiglo and Tai were not the sole activity of one person, but the name of Yahi Octave was 
repeated several times in interviews. 33 
In urban areas, the peace-led initiatives had a different dynamic. Religious communities were the 
most active. In Abidjan, three days of fast and one day inter-faith meeting was organised at the 
central stadium in January 2003, which was also attended by the president Gbagbo. Many other 
events were organised just after violent clashes, followed by joint declarations by the leader of the 
catholic and Muslim community, the archbishop Bernard Agre and the Iman Idriss Koudouss. With 
the national reconciliation underway from 2005 onwards, the Catholic Church and Islamic institution 
were even more active, especially with the Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace commission, which 
organised many campaigns for peace and reconciliation. For the 2010 presidential electoral 
campaign, Catholic Church and Islamic leaders created the ‘collectifs des religieux pour des élections 
apaisées’ In urban settings, these national initiatives took the form of visits by Christians in mosques 
or the opposite, or football matches between priests and imams.  
There were many locally-driven initiatives. On the 26 February 2005, a local Christian Islamic 
committee was created in the town of Man, which was a very active committee with many joint 
activities around social cohesion, peace prayers and condolence visits (Miran-Guyon, 2015: 121). 
Another similar local committee was created in the Bandama region under the auspices of 
Monseigneur Simeon Ahouna (Miran-Guyon, 2015:  130). In Duékoué, where the tensions were very 
high, the apostle Georges Kohikan Gbeno of the Pentecost church started dialoguing with Muslim 
leaders from 2007 onwards to preach disarmament and peace. This last example is particularly 
interesting as the evangelist church was linked to the Gbagbo regime and was not known for its 
moderate positions (although of course there are many different types of churches under 
evangelism). Besides, religious figures were involved in social cohesion programs and peace 
committee funded by donor programs. Iman Dosso Mamadou, the Iman of the Cite mosque based in 
Sogefia in San Pedro, was a member of the GTZ peace and development committee, and was very 
                                                          
31 Interview with Yahi Octave, 18 December 2015, at San Pedro, Cote d’Ivoire.  
32 Interview with Yahi Octave, op. cit.  
33 Interview with Ki Jacques, 10/02/2012 and Nemaigny Glacel and Kamandé Hervé, Youth leaders in Guiglo, 11/02/2012  
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active in his community. During the post electoral crisis in 2011, he realised how explosive the 
situation could become as most of the youth were armed following the departure of the security 
forces. He created his own disarmament programme by asking all the youngsters to deliver their 
arms to his house.  
The town of Gagnoa is an interesting example in both showing how members of the community 
were active in creating an island of peace but at the same time showing how fortunate 
circumstances helped this zone to exist. Mr Gauze Emmanuel Desire, the former Sub Governor of 
Gagnoa intervened following a major incident in town during the post electoral crisis in 2011. A 
young Baoule peasant was burnt by the Young Patriots. Following his intervention, the Sub Governor 
managed to find a negotiated solution between the different communities (Allouche & Zadi, 2013). 
The situation became even more explosive situation as the security forces had deserted their 
barracks and the youth from both political wings had stolen all the arms. What happened was that 
robbery in the major shop of the town became more attractive for both youth groups and acted as a 
factor for peace. The situation could have easily degenerated but both groups were together in the 
shop and all became young individuals interested in immediate material gain rather than political 
confrontation.  
The situation overall in urban settings were more complex and volatile. While violence was more 
prone in rural settings, the issue was largely with respect to land tenure agreements and conflict 
resolution mechanisms. In urban settings, the influence of national politics and networks made it 
more unstable. The case of the town of Duékoué is an interesting case to point out. Religious 
institutions were quite active as highlighted above. But they were other types of spiritual conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Violent tensions emerged on the 3rd of January 2011 when 32 people were 
killed after a Guinean woman was assassinated. Ahoua Toure and Yahi Octave convened a large 
meeting with representatives of the different ethnic groups and religious communities. On the 4th of 
January, Yahi Octave went to the central mosque and explained the mystical origins of the town of 
Duékoué in an effort to suppress identity divisions. He recalled that their elders decided to do a 
human sacrifice around the Guemon Lake and that the young virgin girl sacrificed was of Senufo 
origin. By this mystical tale, he was showing how the town was built on the blood of this young girl 
and that the violence was now killing again this young girl. Migrants and non-migrants had built 
together this town. However, two months later, nothing could be done to stop one of the biggest 
massacres of the post electoral crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. 34 
The other criticisms to this analysis is that the divide between urban and rural dynamics should not 
be exaggerated as both worlds are connected. In fact, there were also local peace initiatives that 
were trying to build new ties between rural areas surrounding the urban centres. Some members of 
the Guiglo community in Côte d’Ivoire were reaching out to other villages. For example, the initiative 
in the Soukoura village was followed two weeks later, by a visit from the leaders of the village at 
Guiglo, thereby break the silos and helping to restore the trust between these different geographical 
communities.  
                                                          
34 www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/04/02/des-affrontements-ont-fait-au-moins-800-morts-a-duekoue-selon-le-
cicr_1502042_3212.html#ens_id=1476585 
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The relationships between these peace initiatives in communities and armed groups is interesting in 
many ways. In the western region of Côte d’Ivoire, one obvious link has been Yahi Octave. He is a 
man of paradox. While he was active in trying to create a dialogue between the different opposing 
parties and faciliatating the creation of zones of peace, he was the leader of a militia (UPRGO). The 
objective of the militia was to recreate stability and expulse Liberian mercenaries that stayed in the 
region after the 2002 war. The movement contributed to the security of the area. However, certain 
elements, in particular those under the supervision of Banao in Duékoué, became much more 
radicalised, they were more aggressive than defensive and committed a number of acts of violence 
leading to many deaths.35 This paradox between leading both peace and war initiatives is well 
explained in the following quote by Yahi Octave himself when attacks happened in 2005 in the 
villages of Guitrozon and petit-Duékoué, declaring "we are not attacking. We are resisting. When 
there are no rebel attacks, we do nothing. Some are even in the fields. We do not have the time and 
the means to attack; however, once we are attacked, we will defend ourselves"36 Yahi Octave also 
created a local NGO, Nouvelle Famille, to have more freedom and manoeuvre as some of his 
different reconciliation initiatives were not appreciated and supported by other political leaders in 
the region. Of course, one could argue that this approach started in 2006 when it became clear that 
a local political settlement would prevail over a military one. Yahi Octave represents an interesting 
example of the fluidity of individual trajectories during conflicts and the importance of agency within 
networks of peace and conflict. It is not uncommon for individual agents to change sides, become 
agents of violence and also for peace at different points of the conflict. Octave is not just a peace 
leader, he was a politician and a war hero, he had legitimacy amongst fighters as well as local 
traditional communities and was able to use this legitimacy to act as an agent between different 
groups.  
But the relationships between these peace initiatives in communities and armed groups is more 
complex than this example may appear to prove. Relationship may not be the right word. Armed 
actors were not clearly separate from rural or urban communities. Armed actors were not 
necessarily organized and seen as an obvious contact point. In rural areas, this distinction was even 
more porous and they were no clear examples of relationship between these locally driven 
initiatives and armed actors. The final factor to consider is also the chronology of the conflict and the 
motivation of these militias and armed forces. Many of the militia members in 2010 and 2011 were 
disillusioned and lacked motivation. In Gagnoa the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration 
failed to deliver promises of training and indenisation and the militias became less ideological. 
Communities included armed individuals decided to distance themselves from a war that is not 
theirs and act to redeem their right to live peacefully. 
This relates to our last point of analysis which is about how the peace processes in these zones of 
peace were driven. Many of these local peace processes were internally driven but it is important 
that micro-level histories do not ignore the national environment’s role in shaping and containing 
violence. Firstly, chronologically, it is important to understand that from 2005 onwards until the post 
electoral crisis in 2011, the political dynamics operating in the country were more peaceful, with the 
constitution of a coalition government in 2005, although the underlying tensions were still present. 
                                                          
35 ONUCI (Opération des Nations unies en Côte d’Ivoire), Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme et du droit 
international humanitaire commises à l’Ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, 10 mai 2011, <reliefweb.int>. 
36 A Fraternité Matin article, appearing on allAfrica.com on 1 February 2006, 
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A second factor has been that the violence of the 2011 post-electoral crisis was limited to two key 
geo-strategic areas, the town of Duékoué and the capital city. Military violence in this sense was 
limited as there were no direct confrontations between the New Forces and the army that was 
under the orders of Gbagbo.  The battle in the town of Duékoué had also an important psychological 
effect. Following the loss of the town, many armed groups started to fear the power of the Dozos 
and their mystic powers. Similar to in Sierra Leone, these groups were believed to have magical 
powers to become invisible soldiers. After the first battle in Duékoué, one should not underestimate 
the impact of fear and rumours on the logic of the restraint of violence.  
Finally, it is important to question this external / internal dichotomy as proposed by Idler et al. In 
many of these peace zones, the most influential person was an ‘influential national outsider that was 
an insider’. This was the case of Zadi Kessy Marcel or Yahi Octave that live in the capital city or 
regional towns but that had strong connections with their native villages. Or in other cases, these 
were externally appointed insiders, whether as sub-governors or as religious leaders.  
Sierra Leone  
In Sierra Leone, diamonds played a central role at the onset and throughout the civil war and, in 
some communities, were reportedly used to buy peace, something that is frequently reported by 
former combatants37. One documented example relates to a diamonds-for-peace arrangement but 
also to the continuing operation of local diamond trading in Kenema throughout the war, as a way to 
facilitate the transfer of diamonds to global diamond markets38.  The Kenema ‘island of peace’ 
rested on the uneasy assumption that mining and trading in diamonds was more profitable than 
conflict. Government-supported Kamajor militia (CDF) and RUF fighters were reported to be mining 
together and then trading in town. The Government threatened to raise taxes and make this difficult 
but government inspectors were then paid off as a ‘contribution to the war effort’39. In other words, 
Kenema managed to survive as a peaceful space because it was useful to both sides, and the cost of 
taking the city, was greater than the benefits of keeping the diamond trade going. The diamond-
trading rebels have an interest in maintaining the status quo in order to facilitate access to diamond 
markets and supplies, but also because many of them had family in the city, producing a stalemate 
that suited both sides. It also talks to the core motivation of some of the rebel groups and their 
interest in mining rather than any broader ideological aims. 
                                                          
37 The author carried out extensive fieldwork in the countryside between 2002-5 where this was frequently raised in 
conversation – ‘oh yes, we knew he was RUF, but he came in to town to sell diamonds’. 
38 These arrangements in Kenema are partly documented by UK’s Guardian newspaper in ‘Diamonds buy peace for Sierra 
Leone city’, 24 June, 2000, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/24/sierraleone, although the author was also in 
Kenema shortly after this episode. The peace referred to is both the peace at the local level but also the fact that the Lome 
Peace Accord led to several RUF leaders being incorporated in to Government at this time. That peace was relatively short 
lived. There were other activities taking place in the town, including peace education by the INGO World Vision (Concord 
Times (Freetown) 31 July, 2000). This is also mentioned in the USAID Field Report of July 2000 available at: 
https://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/usaid-field-report-sierra-leone-jul-2000 
39 This was reflected across several different interviews during fieldwork immediately after the war between 2002-2005 in 
several districts across Sierra Leone, but is little documented. There is some mention of these rather unstable 
arrangements within the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Report , available here: 
http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-the-final-report/download-table-of-contents.  
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After the collapse of the first set of peace agreements40, in the withdrawal of the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the Nigerian peacekeepers, 
Kenema was garrisoned by around 800 unarmed Sierra Leone Army (SLA) soldiers and 800 Ghanaian 
peacekeepers. The Ghanaians were amongst the best troops that faced the rebels during the 
ECOMOG intervention and had an excellent reputation. Disciplined, well-armed and well trained, the 
Ghanaians, supported by local CDF, had already proved that the RUF could not take Kenema without 
a fight. However, this situation suited the local conditions and Kenema benefitted from a useful 
stand-off whereby both sides could come in to the town to trade diamonds41. There are other 
examples of local deals being done that were essentially commercial deals or a form of buying peace 
with diamonds but most are verbal examples of this type of activity and not documented, even 
though they are thought to be widespread during the war42.  
In Sierra Leone, the leader of the Organisation for Peace, Reconciliation and Development Sierra 
Leone (OPARD-SL), Mukson Sesay, played a key role in facilitating peacebuilding in Mile 9143, which 
represented another island of peace during the war44. The success of OPARD during the war in 
brokering peace at the local level was in no small way down to the skills and background of Mukson 
Sesay, who, like many members of OPARD who had close relationships with RUF rebels, was a 
former combatant himself. Sesay had been head of a rebel group called G5 that had enjoyed 
considerable power during the war, managing movement of civilians between villages (Keen, 2005). 
This meant that Sesay and others were very well connected in the RUF personally and were able to 
use those contacts to broker peace between the UN and the RUF in 2000. A group committed to 
peacebuilding after their experiences, OPARD was able to broker a significant peace agreement at 
Komrabai and also to negotiate the opening of the main road between Mile 91 and Magburaka for 
the transportation of foodstuffs.  OPARD is located in Mile 91 and exists to facilitate peacebuilding. 
Critically, OPARD existed during the war and played an important role in facilitating the 8 December 
2000 meeting between RUF and UNAMSIL that aided the peace process overall. This meeting was 
held at Robis Ferry junction between Mile 91 and Magburaka and is held to be so significant that it 
now has a peace monument. Mile 91 itself was attacked by the RUF some 19 times during the war 
and with the nearby road junction at Masiaka, subjected to several changes of control45. 
In Sierra Leone, the Sulima Fishing Community Development Project (SFCDP) developed alternative 
local judicial mechanisms during the war.  The SFCDP was originally established in the extreme 
Southern district of Pujehun on the border with Liberia on the coast. Pujehun was marginalised for 
years before the war started in 1991 following an earlier conflict in 1982, known as the Ndogboyasi 
                                                          
40 Allouche, J. ‘Politics, exit strategy and political settlement in Sierra Leone: a critical analysis of a laboratory experiment 
(1991–2015)’, Conflict, Security and Development, 17 (3) (2017), 225-46. 
41 Field interviews, March 2002, Kenema. Discussion with USAID, Sierra Leone Team Leader, UNDP Team Leader and 
Ministry of Community and Local Government, (now the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development) 2002. 
42 There is considerable anecdotal evidence for this, but little systematic documented evidence. During interviews with 
former combatants and local officials in 2003-4 in Kenema, Kailahun and Makeni this was raised as a matter of course. 
43 Mile 91 got its rather evocative name because it is the end of the tarmac road out of Freetown. They got 91 miles and 
stopped, where a sizeable terminus built up. Strategically it therefore important in its own right as a strategic junction 
linking Freetown with Makeni and Bo. 
44 OPARD maintains a detailed website here: http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/sierra-leone/sierra-leone-
peacebuilding-organisations/opard-sl/ 
45 The author visited Mile 91 several times between 2002 and 2012, interviewing local chiefs and chiefdom treasury clerks 
in March, April and May 2004 and then local government officials in September 2004 and January and February 2005. 
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War, where the ruling All People's Congress (APC) unleashed a ‘special squad’ of customs police 
against the fishing community46. There was no reconciliation following this violence and 
consequently many local people were amongst the first to join the RUF in 1991. The peace accords 
of 1996 led to the kamajors taking control of Pujehun district, but the 1997 coup led to exile for 
many pro-RUF and local leaders of the project and the marginalisation of the traditional Paramount 
Chiefs system.  
However, in the refugee camps in Liberia, the SFCDP regrouped and held a series of community 
meetings in the camps along the Liberian border in order to prepare for their return to Pujehun. This 
consisted of needs analysis and reconciliation between generations, and between RUF and non-RUF. 
Consequently, when the refugees returned following the end of the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) junta in 1998, the community was able to take a role in tackling issues like 
community dispute resolution, ‘palavers’47, youth misbehaviour, the degraded system of chieftaincy 
and conflicts between returnees and those who stayed behind48. 
The SFCDP works through peace monitors and there is one monitor for each section of the Chiefdom 
to resolve disputes and for early intervention to prevent conflicts. There are also grievance 
committees and local cases are brought to this committee for arbitration. The twelve peace 
monitors work for ten days each month for a small stipend and are also usually respected Koranic 
scholars49. Where there are local grievances over drug abuse, land issues, family matters, etc. the 
people prefer to go to the peace monitors over courts. One side effect of this is that the local 
administration is hampered in its functioning because it cannot gather sufficient revenue to function 
effectively – and this also leads to resentment of local officials. It costs 10,000 Leones ($4) to go to 
the Native Authority Courts but peace monitors are free50. 
The social upheaval involved in the conflict had led to a significant change in legitimacy at local level 
and the usurping of chiefs as the only conflict resolution vehicle – essentially the war had led to the 
emergence of new leaders at community level. Social cohesion was certainly enhanced by the fact 
that this community is overwhelmingly Muslim, and that the infrastructure had been in decay since 
before the initial war in 1982, so the community felt quite isolated from the rest of the country51. 
The leaders who emerged from this situation were all proposed locally and then given training in 
conflict resolution whilst in exile in Liberia. These people then became the location of choice for local 
dispute resolution rather than the native courts, bypassing traditional social hierarchies upheld by 
the chiefs. These ‘peace monitors’ are able to intervene at a local level to prevent conflict escalation, 
are able to talk and negotiate with all sides and even able to call on additional support with bigger 
disputes between villages. Overall, the peace monitor approach has been able to provide effective 
                                                          
46 Massaquoi, J. Building mechanisms for conflict resolution in south-east Sierra Leone:  The Sulima Fishing Community 
Development Project. Paper presented at the First Conference on All African Principles of Conflict Resolution and 
Reconciliation, Addis Ababa, November 1999. Available at: http://www.c-
r.org/downloads/BuildingMechanismsForConflictResolution_199911_ENG.pdf 
47 ‘Palaver’ is a generic Sierra Leonean term for a local dispute, hence chiefs hear disputes in their ‘Palaver huts’ in the 
villages. During fieldwork in Pujehun, this is typically where the author met traditional officials. 
48 Massaquoi, ‘Building mechanisms’ 
49 Baker, B. ‘Who do People Turn to for Policing in Sierra Leone?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 23, 3, (2005) 
371- 390. 
50 Baker, B. Security in Post-Conflict Africa: The Role of Nonstate Policing. (London: CRC Press, 2009) 
51 Field interviews in the district also reinforced this ‘otherness’. 
16 
 
conflict resolution at the local level and to develop a resolution system that is regarded as fairer than 
the original native court system said to be one of the root causes of disaffection before the war 
itself52.  
Sierra Leone has a number of peace monitor groups at the local level and they have expanded out 
from their usual urban bases in to rural areas. The Bo Peace and Reconciliation Movement (BPRM), 
for example, is a coalition of 11 community groups working on conflict prevention and mitigation 
and its twenty peace monitors resolve conflicts ranging from family matters through to land cases 
and leadership disputes (they handled 255 cases in 2004 alone) and the evidence shows that they 
have certainly helped with reintegration of former combatants and also in reducing recourse to 
litigation in local courts53. 
Conclusions:  What might an African approach to zones of peace look like? 
This article has used six examples where civilians have managed to prevent, or at least delay violent 
conflict. The nature of the examples does mean that there are limitations with regard to 
generaliseable conclusions, but we remain convinced that they should be not ignored as a result. 
The literature on civil wars is notably quiet on instances where there have been lulls in the fighting, 
‘islands of peace’ or ‘zones of peace’. The six examples outlined in this article can be arranged 
around the three sub-groups proposed by Idler et al54: the characteristics of the civil resistance 
movement in the peace territory; the relationship of the community with armed actors; and the role 
of external actors.  
Where local peace efforts were successful, even in the short term, there was an alignment of factors 
that supported a particular set of agreements that reduced violence. Whilst certainly not 
constituting peace processes in a lasting sense, all of the cases may contribute to ideas of how 
civilians can achieve peace for periods of time during a war. The Ivorian village of Yacoli Dabouo 
could constitute a longer-term agreement where the work of a local notable, Zadi Kessy Marcel, 
could be said to constitute a real process which prevented land-related violence by putting in place 
clear and consensual mechanisms for the usage of land.  
What is clear from each of these cases is how war in many ways represents violence against social 
structures55. Our research certainly complements other research in Liberia and Nigeria that shows 
that civilians can affect conflict and violence if they enjoy sufficient legitimacy and authority56. The 
presence of violent actors who are capable of defeating civilians, does not mean that they will act 
upon that. Legitimacy and authority derive from their embeddedness within local institutional 
structures, the ability of big men to act and shape those structures and the relationship of the 
particular community with the armed actors. There is therefore an alignment of agency and 
structure that does not speak to a simple dichotomy between them.  
                                                          
52 Richards,Fighting for the Rain Forest;  Jackson, P. ‘Chiefs, Money and Politicians: Rebuilding Local Government in Sierra 
Leone’, Public Administration and Development, 25 (2005) 48-58; Jackson, P. ‘Reshuffling an old deck of cards? The politics 
of decentralisation in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs January, 106 (2007) 95-111 
53 Baker, Security in Post-Conflict Africa 
54 Idler et al, ‘Peace territories in Colombia’ 
55 Duffield, New Wars 
56 Moran, Ethnograpy of Political Violence; Krause, ‘Non-Violence and Civilian Agency’ 
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Local communities can flee or stay, but if they stay they face choices about their ability to resist, the 
likelihood of the violent group being susceptible to coexistence or dealing, and the opportunities for 
collaboration or collusion in, for example, the extraction of resources. In the absence of formal state 
control, the simple binary between ‘government’ and ‘rebel’ does not always hold true in either case 
that we examine here, with considerable shifts in the makeup of each side throughout the wars in 
question. The characteristics of each force, of the war itself and the political order during wartime 
are shaped by the political relationships between the contenders.  
All of these instances of localised peace are not just internally driven. They all closely relate to the 
nature and willingness of the violent movement to accommodate or resist them. The RUF in Sierra 
Leone were not capable of entirely controlling Pujehun or Kenema in the face of resilient, well 
organised and coherent opposition. It was far less costly to them to come to an accommodation with 
the local leadership and essentially leave them alone. Violent movements like rebel groups cannot 
maintain order for long periods of time through coercion alone57. Rebels must take into 
consideration the demands made by local populations to secure loyalty at least partly because 
challenges to power may be more costly than inclusion in decision making, but also because mass 
killing of civilians is expensive and potentially counter-productive. It must also allow for the 
organisation of resistance in the form of defence militias and local volunteer forces that may be 
more capable than many rebel groups. Certainly, the government-aligned militias in Sierra Leone 
and Côte d’Ivoire were able to insert themselves in to local networks of violence and change the 
nature of the social structures surrounding the civilian population both in terms of enhancing 
customary authorities, but also by providing a space where the rebel army and forces could not 
guarantee victory. This creates space for negotiation between civilian and violent groups that may 
include a wide spectrum of activity ranging from collusion to outright resistance. 
The nature of the wars themselves in both Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone were extremely fluid, 
subject to rapid change and included actors who may have been acting for both sides. In this way, 
the nature of zones of peace within West Africa differs from the Colombian examples that inform 
the literature on zones of peace. In particular, the long-term nature of the Colombia war provides a 
far more stable framework, no matter how violent, for developing lasting zones of peace, whereas 
the examples drawn from Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone are invariably short term and unstable over 
time. This reflects the fluid and unpredictable nature of the warring parties, the fact that there were 
no ‘front lines’ and the conflicts themselves tend to comprise series of social convulsions rather than 
prolonged ideological struggles. This means that the more temporary zones in Africa are far less 
institutionalised that those in Colombia and perhaps more reliant on a few central factors, including 
the power of individual agents to broker short term deals, temporary financial arrangements that 
reflect the aims of some rebels and redistribution of some resources, including land, to allow the 
diffusion of conflict.  
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